



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXII NUMBER 7



Sino-Soviet Partnership

by Robert C. North

The controversy in the UN about India's Korean resolution has revived speculation concerning relations between Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. The Sino-Soviet conference held in Moscow from August 18 to September 23 announced on September 16 that the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic were taking steps toward returning to China the Manchurian, or Changchun, railways (a combination of the old Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian lines) but that the Peiping government had "requested" Moscow to delay withdrawing Russian troops from Port Arthur until treaty relations are established between the two countries and Japan. No mention was made of Dairen, but presumably this city, too, remains with the Russians.

The Chinese appear to have suffered a diplomatic setback, but if viewed along with the tightening of Russian controls in East Germany, the Peiping "peace" congress and recent reorganizations of the Soviet hierarchy, the Moscow conference suggests a consolidation of Communist power and possible new aggressiveness.

Both the Manchurian railways and the Port Arthur and Dairen leaseholds date back to the

days of Tsarism in Russia. In 1905 the Imperial government lost to Japan the two leaseholds obtained from China in 1898. Following the Bolshevik revolution the Chinese Eastern Railway, built by the Russians in collaboration with China, passed temporarily into Allied control, and the Kremlin, through the Karakhan Declaration of 1919, appeared to renounce rights to the line. Later Moscow claimed a misinterpretation, and the railway remained in controversy until 1935, when Moscow sold it to Japan.

Through the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, Soviet diplomacy won back the railway and leaseholds. Stalin based his claims on "rights" which Japan had wrongfully taken away. As "winner" of the war and "rescuer" of Manchuria, the U.S.S.R. reasoned that without Soviet aid the Chinese would have lost the region altogether.

The Stalin-Mao agreements of 1950 guaranteed to Communist China the return of Port Arthur, Dairen and the Manchurian railways either on conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan or "toward the end of 1952." Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was recognized, and Moscow promised the return of "war booty"

DECEMBER 15, 1952

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED
22 EAST 38TH STREET • NEW YORK 16, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

extracted from Manchuria. The Soviet Union offered Peiping \$300 million in credits, and the Mongolian People's Republic was declared independent of China. The U.S.S.R. and China pledged mutual assistance against Japanese aggression and against "any other state" combining with Japan aggressively.

The 1950 agreements did not state whether return of the Changchun Railway would include transfer to China of factories, auxiliary railroads and other enterprises connected with the line. Westerners generally conceded, however, that the treaty enhanced Soviet prestige in Asia and strengthened Mao's position.

Against this background the September agreements look like a defeat for Mao. The Chinese "request," if bona fide, admits China's inability to defend its integrity without Soviet help. If the request is a face-saving device, it does not conceal that Mao's government, in submitting to extended Russian occupation of Port Arthur, relinquishes a 1950 gain without compensation. One wonders, moreover, whether Manchurian railways can be independent, with Russian troops occupying territory at both ends and terminals tying the system into Russian railroads.

No Break in Sight

The Sino-Soviet honeymoon may be over, but we cannot infer a breakup. Russian and Chinese Communists have often rubbed each other the wrong way, and even their common ideology is not likely to eradicate stresses historically created by their common border. Yet Mao has

always worked within the framework of world communism, and the two governments share a compulsion to drive Western powers from Asia.

The recent agreements may reflect a gain in Russian influence over the Chinese Communists. When Mao reached Moscow in 1950 he held a position which no living Communist, other than Stalin, had enjoyed. His party was powerful and second in size only to that of Russia; his army was large, victorious and relatively independent; his government ruled one of the largest, most populous nations on earth. In contrast, when China's Foreign Minister Chou En-lai visited Moscow this September, Chinese armies were locked in a costly struggle in Korea and, far from being victorious or independent, found themselves relying on Russia for support.

Peiping's Dependence

The Chinese people, if pushed too hard, may break away, but this seems unlikely so long as both Russia and China regard the West as a common enemy. Moreover, the Soviet Union implements its foreign policy on several levels—both legal and subversive—with complicated machinery within machinery and effective techniques of penetration. Precisely what controls—economic or political—the Russians may have established over China is arguable. Soviet "advisers" play important roles; economic agreements have opened parts of China to Russian exploitation; Sino-Soviet joint enterprises facilitate further Soviet penetration. Other countries have discovered that the Russians, once

embraced, are difficult to throw off.

War and Chinese isolation from the West have placed Peiping in an increasingly dependent position. Unless the Chinese devise ways for building their strength relative to that of the U.S.S.R., they may find themselves manning Russian weapons in the interests of Moscow's policy for a long time to come.

Despite this inequality of sacrifice, the Russo-Chinese power combination may achieve formidable effectiveness—and not simply in an Asian context. True, Russia's retention of Port Arthur suggests a determination to carry on and perhaps step up Communist activities in Asia. The decisions of the Sino-Soviet conference, however, cannot be considered apart from the situation in Europe. But the more serious aspect of the situation is that multinational Communist forces, under Russian leadership, are linking together the whole vast territory from Berlin to Port Arthur.

There are not two fronts—in Europe and the Far East—but a wide and increasingly consolidated perimeter circumscribing an enormous segment of the earth's population and land surface. As transportation facilities improve, it will be more and more feasible for Communist forces to feint or strike out from any one point or combination of points on this perimeter.

(Mr. North, a research associate at the Hoover Institute and Library, Stanford University, is managing editor of *The Pacific Spectator*. He has recently been awarded a Ford Foundation fellowship for finishing a volume on Soviet political strategy and tactics toward China.)

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 22 E. 38th St., New York 16, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: J. BARTLET BREBNER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • ANNA LORD STRAUSS • SUMNER WELLES. BROOKS EMENY, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; BLAIR BOLLES, *Washington Correspondent*; FELICE NOVICH, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to public understanding by presenting a cross section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. Re-entered as second-class matter September 26, 1951 at the post office at New York, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347.

Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.



New Tests of Bipartisanship

The coming shift of party responsibility for the planning and conduct of United States foreign policy will cast new light on the meaning of bipartisanship in this sphere.

Role of Minority

Until now the country has had few yardsticks for judging accurately whether bipartisanship in the past has meant that members of both parties have had an equal influence in determining the nature and course of foreign policy, or whether the minority party simply serves the party in office patriotically without attempting to do more than to modify its tendencies.

The emergence of the United States as an active participant in the arena of world affairs has taken place under Democratic Administrations. Moreover, during this transition era, except for the period from January 3, 1947 to January 3, 1949, Democrats have been in the majority in both houses of Congress. The history of the activities of the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, makes it pretty plain that at least so far as the United Nations and Europe were concerned, he was at times a policy creator. It also seems obvious that in certain areas John Foster Dulles has made truly original contributions to policy, although in the recent election campaign he criticized the departing Administration's approach to international relations. But for the many other Republicans who during recent years have held posts in the Executive Branch of the government, the answer is not at all clear.

In its conduct of foreign affairs the Eisenhower Administration is likely

to rely on a number of Republican business and professional leaders who have been connected with the Truman Administration. The country will thus have an opportunity to see whether these men deal with world problems differently when their party has responsibility than they did when they were in the role of loyal co-operators.

Republicans Under Truman

The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, a prominent New York lawyer, has been an important participant in foreign policy for more than eight years. During the Presidential election campaign of 1944, when Franklin D. Roosevelt and Governor Thomas E. Dewey were the opponents, he represented Governor Dewey in conferences with Secretary of State Cordell Hull and took part in the discussions that year at Dumbarton Oaks on the form of the United Nations, in which he subsequently represented the United States. In 1951 he negotiated the treaty of peace with Japan and the treaties of alliance with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. At that time he had the title of consultant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Among other Republicans who worked with Truman in foreign affairs are John J. McCloy, Paul C. Hoffman and William H. Draper. Mr. McCloy, who, like Mr. Dulles, is a New York lawyer, served as Assistant Secretary of War when Franklin D. Roosevelt was President. With the backing of the Truman Administration, he became president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1947.

Two years later President Truman named him United States High Commissioner in Germany.

Mr. Hoffman, a businessman now president of the Ford Foundation, with headquarters in Pasadena, California, was the first chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration, set up in 1948 to carry out the Marshall plan. He held the office until 1950. The ECA has been succeeded by the Mutual Security Agency, which oversees the economic and military aid programs, and will now be headed by Harold E. Stassen. Mr. Draper, a general during World War II, was Assistant Secretary of the Army in charge of occupied areas after the war. Last spring President Truman appointed him his representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris.

The willingness of Republican leaders and businessmen of both parties to serve in foreign policy and related posts in the Truman Administration is impressive. These Republicans have helped to mold the defense establishments. With the exception of the two and one-half years, from the spring of 1949 to the fall of 1951 (when Louis A. Johnson and General George C. Marshall successively were Secretaries of Defense) Republicans and businessmen have had the leading defense posts. Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox became Secretaries of War and Navy in 1940. James V. Forrestal was the first Secretary of Defense. Robert A. Lovett, present Secretary of Defense, is a Republican.

Since the creation of the United Nations, the United States representative to the UN and representative

(Continued on page 8)



What Should the New Administration Do in Asia?

by Harold H. Fisher

Mr. Fisher, historian and student of American relations with Russia and Asia, is chairman of the Hoover Institute and Library at Stanford University.

In Asia the new Administration should face some of the basic issues with which our policies must deal, and face them with more seriousness and less partisanship than have yet been shown by either party.

A long-range view must take the following factors into account:

(1) The Chinese Communists appear to be firmly in control of the mainland of China. We must assume that whether we like it or not, the Communists will continue for a considerable time to direct China's relations with us, with Asian nations, and with the rest of the world.

(2) The continuation of conflict and ill-feeling between China and the United States is to the obvious advantage of the U.S.S.R. because it makes China dependent on Russia for material as well as political support. Sino-American conflict, in spite of its costs, is temporarily advantageous to the Chinese Communists because they can use the charges of American imperialist aggression to justify the brutalities and sacrifices they impose on their people. The Sino-American conflict harms our relations with other Asian countries, which consider the Communists as the government of China and wish to deal with that government in political, economic and cultural relations. The Japanese government, for example, is anti-Communist, but it is bound to press increasingly for the right to trade with China.

(3) Although the Chinese Communists kowtow to Stalin, we need not assume that they always will or that a great country like China will become a satellite of Russia. The

long Sino-Russian border from Sinkiang through Outer and Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea has been the scene of Sino-Russian conflict for three centuries. The causes of that conflict are still latent and are almost certain to be revived once China becomes strong enough to uphold its interests in these areas.

Russia and China endanger peace and order in Asia when they work together to impose Communist rule on other countries. Obviously, if Russia and China, for whatever reason, stopped working together and became concerned about whose word was to be law along the Sino-Soviet border, it would be better for Asia and better for us.

How to Fight Communism

The new Administration cannot and should not suddenly reverse our China policy. It should recognize, however, that it will take more than an armistice or even a decisive military victory in Korea to achieve peace in Asia.

Some of our citizens urge that in Asia we fight fire with fire, by which they appear to mean that we use Koreans to fight Koreans and Chinese to fight Chinese. Has the time not come to recognize that there may be other means of fighting fire with fire, and that one of them is to take advantage of the weaknesses and conflicts which absolute dictatorships, sooner or later, have always revealed?

Stalin recently reiterated the dogma that the capitalists will be unable to subordinate their rivalries and co-operate with each other and with Asian countries.

Proving Stalin wrong is not, as Senator Alexander Wiley suggested in a recent article,* just a matter "of plain speaking and plain action" to convince the underdeveloped areas that the principal means of helping them is not United States governmental aid but private American investments and that such investments are possible only if a favorable climate for investment is guaranteed. A favorable climate for economic development requires that the people of the Asian countries should themselves want economic progress and that they be helped to modify their social, economic, legal and political institutions so as to make progress possible. This means that investment in people is as necessary as investment in material resources. Education in public health and in agricultural methods is needed to increase production. University education is needed to train administrators. Vocational training is essential to provide skilled workers for modern industry and communications.

Facing the Revolution

Economic progress depends on reform of the political and social system of privilege, which in Asia goes under the general name of "feudalism." If our economic and technical aid is to produce economic progress and political stability, we must support political and social reforms that will end the monopoly of political

(Continued on page 6)

*"A Sound Basis for Helping the World," in *U.S.A.: The Magazine of American Affairs*, November 1952, pp. 51-53, published by the National Association of Manufacturers.

by Robert Aura Smith

Mr. Smith, a member of the Editorial Council of *The New York Times*, writes especially about Far Eastern problems. He has recently returned from a comprehensive survey trip of Asia, where he discussed possible American policies with the chiefs of state of eleven countries.

1. The new Administration, first of all, should set the record straight. There should be an official and formal repudiation of the Yalta agreements on the double ground that they are morally repugnant to the American people and that they have been consistently and flagrantly disregarded by the Soviet Union. There should be a formal repudiation and withdrawal of the 1949 White Paper on China. This document was designed to justify President Truman's declaration that we would "give no further aid and advice" to Nationalist China. That policy has been completely reversed and the United States, for the sake of its prestige and honor, should disown the shameful and defeatist White Paper on which it was based. The United States should reaffirm its intention of not recognizing the fruits of aggression and its determination not to reward the aggressor.

2. The United States should continue its military resistance to the Communists and should try to make that resistance more effective. This should involve an accelerated program for the training and equipment of Asian troops in South Korea, Nationalist China, Indochina and the Philippines. There should be a concerted drive to speed up deliveries of materials. There should be a basic overhaul of the Asian propaganda program with the view of making it effective psychological warfare. This would involve a larger use of Asians, pinpoint rather than blanket broadcasting, contact with resistance and guerrilla groups in Red China as listening posts, and larger but sim-

pler use of air-drop and pamphlet techniques.

3. There should be some necessary personnel and positional changes. At home the Administration will wish to divest itself of advisers who have given bad advice. In the field, our positions can be strengthened by such steps, for example, as the elevation of our Minister in Formosa, Karl Rankin, to the grade of Ambassador.

More Use of Asians

4. The Mutual Security and Point Four programs should be continued and strengthened. Some overly complex plans should be discarded. There should be a constant effort to make investment of time, energy, intelligence and money at the grass-roots level. This should, as it works out, mean the larger emphasis on the place of Asians in plans and programs for Asia. More effort should be made to train Asian technicians and more use should be made of those already trained. It should mean, also, constant stress on the fully cooperative character of each enterprise. This can be done both by urging a larger share of Asian, rather than American, planning at each stage, and by a more skillful and imaginative integration of our information work with our assistance programs. This will require, at some points, much better teamwork on the part of different services and agencies.

5. The United States should work more vigorously for regional defense planning and should strongly support the efforts, such as President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines is

making, to bring about closer association among the various Asian states. Hitherto our approach to this problem has been largely negative in that it has stressed the difficulties to be overcome rather than the opportunities that have been presented. This emphasis should be reversed, and while the United States should urge the place of Asian leadership in Asian defense planning, it should not hesitate to take the initiative when that is desirable. This would mean less timidity about the attitudes of the so-called "neutralist" states or blocs and closer *rapprochement* with those who are openly on our side.

6. The United States should recognize, both at home and abroad, the total, rather than the piecemeal, character of the conflict in Asia. It should make plain that it is aware of the nature of the enemy and of the extent of the enemy's threat. It should recognize that the struggle is political, military and economic and that all three categories of weapons must be effectively used. It should attempt a closer integration of Asian planning with European planning, as in the case of France and Indochina. It should attempt to broaden the whole concept of collective security in Asia, especially through the instruments of the organization for collective security, the United Nations.

7. The new Administration should strive to provide, both for Americans and for Asians, the quality of genuine moral leadership. The American people ardently desire such leadership, and the Asian peoples will honor and respect it. There is no need to express this leadership in dramatic reversals of policy and position. There is need to express it in terms that indicate that we do not propose to compromise with what is evil, but that we are determined to give our fullest devotion to that which is good.

Fisher

(Continued from page 4)

and economic power by a small class, will open careers of leadership to persons of all classes, and will encourage free enterprise in ideas as well as in development projects.

The new Administration might face the fact that a far-reaching revolution has occurred in our economic, as well as our political, foreign relations. We have only about 6 percent of the world's population and 7 percent of its area, but we produce 50 percent of the whole world's industrial output. The development of our economy has made us a "have not"

nation, increasingly dependent on foreign sources for the raw materials our industry uses.

But our resources are limited, and we must use them wisely. We can do so only by knowledge of, and cooperation with, the Asian nations. It is not enough to send out as our representatives businessmen who, in Senator Wiley's words, "can talk cold turkey to foreign governments instead of bureaucratic lingo." Experience has shown that the technology of economically advanced countries cannot be transplanted unchanged to underdeveloped countries. Labor-saving devices will not help countries

with a surplus of labor; they need capital-saving devices. We should have more knowledge of Asia to determine what kind of development projects are adapted to the given climate and other conditions.

We are slowly developing a method of dealing with Asians based on the principle that their problems—security, trade, economic and social developments—can be solved only with the participation of Asians. This method can be carried further through the agencies of the United Nations and by bilateral arrangements based on equality and mutual respect.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

The UN: Crisis or Growing Pains?

The stepped-up tempo of attacks on the United Nations from various quarters in the United States reached a climax with the McCarran Committee's investigation into alleged American subversives in the UN Secretariat. This investigation—held in New York as the seventh General Assembly, already overshadowed by uncertainties about the administrative interregnum in Washington, was trying to grapple with the problems of a Korean truce—was blamed by UN Secretary General Trygve Lie for the suicide of his General Counsel, Abraham H. Feller, and deepened the atmosphere of gloom which has permeated the UN's magnificent new headquarters since the opening of the Assembly on October 14.

International Civil Service

American criticisms of the UN, the McCarran investigation, and the General Assembly debates on Korea, on Tunisia and Morocco, and on the racial policies of South Africa have raised four crucial questions:

(1) Will it be possible for the United Nations and affiliated international agencies to create an international civil service imbued with a spirit of dedication to the tasks of cooperation between nations, or will each member state insist on determining who of its citizens should be recruited for UN jobs and what views they should hold about politics and economics?

If each member state has the right to inquire into the ideology of its citizens employed by the UN, then, it is argued, these employees will always be subject to changes in their nations' political and economic ideas and to shifts in their national governments. Under these circumstances would an effective international civil service prove possible? If the United States can demand the dismissal of American citizens whose views or attitudes it questions, then the Soviet bloc could similarly demand the dismissal of Russians, Poles, Czechs and others who oppose communism, the Latin American nations could insist

on a staff turnover whenever they undergo revolutions, and so on. The Western nations, notably Britain, France and the United States, have long maintained a civil service which is independent of political changes and safe from the kind of arbitrary purges which we denounce when they occur under dictatorships. Will the Western nations apply this tradition to the international civil service, or will considerations of national security determine the policies of the international organization?

Some observers have expressed regret that Mr. Lie acquiesced in the dismissal or suspension of UN employees accused by the McCarran Committee without first obtaining the advice of international experts on an issue which goes to the heart of international administrative practices now in process of development. Subsequently Mr. Lie did appoint a committee of three well-known lawyers—William DeWitt Mitchell of the United States, Sir Edwin Herbert of Britain and Paul Veledekens of

Belgium—to examine the problems created by current attacks on certain American employees of the UN, and this committee started its inquiry on November 14.

Does UN Weaken U.S.?

(2) The bitterness of some American attacks on the United Nations is due, first and foremost, to a deep-seated fear that the United Nations, UNESCO and other international agencies will in some way encroach on this country's national sovereignty and, even more important, jeopardize our national security. The growing anxiety aroused by the inconclusive character of the Korean war has greatly sharpened this feeling. Many American critics of the UN believe that the international organization is "dragging its feet," that our Western European allies are not giving us adequate aid in Korea, and that if only the United States could "go it alone" we would promptly bring the war to a close. This is an entirely understandable feeling, particularly on the part of families who have either lost sons in Korea or live in daily fear of what may happen to them in a seemingly endless war.

The violent debates of the Presidential campaign did little to clarify the basic issue. This issue is whether cooperation with the United Nations really weakens the security of the United States, as critics assert, or strengthens it by assuring this country the moral support of the majority of UN members in a war which, had we undertaken it alone, might have been subject to charges of "imperialism." A clear-cut discussion of this issue by spokesmen of the outgoing, as well as incoming, Administration could do a good deal to alleviate public unease, which facilitates the task of UN detractors.

(3) The recrudescence here of sensitiveness about national sovereignty

is duplicated in other members of the UN. The two most striking examples at the current General Assembly are France and South Africa, both of which insist that questions on the agenda about Tunisia and Morocco, and about Premier Daniel F. Malan's racial policies, are "domestic" questions over which the UN has no jurisdiction. Spokesmen of some other countries, for example the Netherlands, which in the past had raised similar objections contend that while the UN has the right to discuss such questions it must not recommend any action.

'Domestic' and 'Foreign'

It is understandable that France and South Africa should object to what appears to them as international intervention in their "domestic" affairs. In an increasingly interdependent world, however, it becomes more and more difficult to draw a precise line between what is "domestic" and what is "foreign" policy. Charles A. Sprague, speaking for the United States delegation on November 15, suggested that the controversy about South Africa should be left to "the lively conscience" of that country's people. This approach holds great appeal. But what if the conscience of a given people or government should prove inert, and the explosive issue should light a match to Africa, as some observers fear? And would it prove possible for the United Nations to continue inquiring into conditions in Russia, Communist China and Eastern Europe, such as forced labor, which are regarded as intolerable, while sidetracking inquiries into conditions in non-Communist countries like France and South Africa which, according to the Arab-Asian group, are creating a danger of conflict?

(4) Can the United Nations survive if the existing gap in economic

and social conditions between the advanced industrial countries and the underdeveloped lands not only persists but, as recent surveys indicate, grows wider? Here the issue is not so much that of national sovereignty as of reluctance on the part of the advanced nations to recognize that the underdeveloped lands require more prompt and extensive action than had been hitherto contemplated. Such action, moreover, will have to consider in the first instance, not the need of Western industries for raw materials, but the need of nonindustrialized nations for the use of the raw materials they produce in the modernization of their agriculture and the production of at least some of the manufactured goods they now import from the West. It is significant that whenever the issue of economic and social development is debated in the General Assembly, the voting lineup differs sharply from that on political issues. For then many of the smaller countries which usually support the United States on such questions as Korea find themselves challenging the Western powers.

A pessimist visiting the United Nations this momentous autumn might feel that international organization has reached a crisis which can only lead to its demise. He might even ask, as many have asked, whether the UN would not function more effectively in another country, where it would be less subject to public attacks than it is in the United States.

The controversies at stake, however, will have to be settled some time or other, and they might just as well be debated right now and right here, where Americans can join in the discussion. And anyone who is willing to pause long enough to view the UN in the perspective of history

(Continued on page 8)

As Others See Us

At a time when the American press has become more conscious than in the past of some of the questions asked by European non-Communists about the United States, it will be important for Americans to know that Paul-Henri Spaak, former Socialist premier of Belgium, told a recent youth conference at The Hague that "relations between Europe and the United States are endangered by strong anti-American feelings growing in Europe." This, he said, "is the worst ingratitude ever shown."

Generally speaking, he went on, "U.S. foreign policy is a righteous and responsible one. Naturally, they are making errors. But Great Britain and France, as well as the smaller European countries, did the same between the two world wars."

Some far-reaching questions about American policy were raised in *Die Zeit* of Hamburg, an independent weekly, by Paul Bourdin on November 13. The interests of the United States and Germany, said this influential journalist, coincide to such an extent that the basis exists for "a lasting partnership" between the two, but it must be a "genuine partnership" and "Germany can only make

the necessary economic and military contribution for winning the peace if America renounces all the restrictive controls of an occupying power."

Die Zeit wants neither foreign-trained partisans, nor foreign agents denouncing Communist activities in Germany, nor foreign newspapers or radio stations (a reference to the American newspaper, *Neue Zeitung*, and to Radio Free Europe in Munich). All these activities, it declares, are detrimental to the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between two countries. "German-American collaboration in foreign policy can only develop if the Americans completely cease their internal political activity in Germany."

Newsletter

(Continued from page 3)

in the Security Council has been Warren R. Austin, formerly a Republican Senator from Vermont. President Truman called on a number of Republicans and businessmen to represent the ECA and the MSA in individual countries abroad. Joseph M. Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank, whom the Administration sent to Japan as financial adviser during the Occupation, is General Eisenhower's representative now in dealing with the Truman Administration's Budget Bureau, which frames the request of the President

to Congress for foreign policy appropriations. With the backing of President Truman, General Eisenhower himself filled an international post as NATO commander at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, from 1951 to 1952.

Neither the Democratic Administration nor those individual Republicans have been obviously party-minded in their concept of national needs in world affairs during the past seven or eight years. For that reason General Eisenhower has available a number of men who acquired first-hand familiarity with international problems under Truman. The coming year will show whether these men will implement or discard the basic policies they have supported in the past.

BLAIR BOLLES

Spotlight

(Continued from page 7)

is bound to reach the conclusion expressed by a Yugoslav delegate that the UN is "a historical necessity." Its debates reveal not a mortal disease but the growing pains of an international body whose members are struggling to reconcile the still powerful urges of national sovereignty with the sobering obligations of genuine, as contrasted with lip-service, international cooperation.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

22 East 38th Street
New York 16, New York

In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

Political Outlook in Japan

by Dr. Royden Dangerfield,
University of Illinois

CASE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
MAIN BLDG. - LIBR. LS-3
10900 EUCLID AVE.
CLEVELAND 6, OHIO